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Abstract. The argument from design stands as one of the most
intuitively compelling arguments for the existence of a divine Cre-
ator. Yet, for many scientists and philosophers, Hume’s critique and
Darwin’s theory of natural selection have definitely undermined the
idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts to design
in nature. Here, we examine empirical studies from developmental
and experimental psychology to investigate the cognitive basis of the
design argument. From this it becomes clear that humans spontane-
ously discern purpose in nature. When constructed theologically and
philosophically correctly, the design argument is not presented as
conclusive evidence for God’s existence but rather as an abductive,
probabilistic argument. We examine the cognitive basis of probabi-
listic judgments in relationship to natural theology. Placing emphasis
on how people assess improbable events, we clarify the intuitive ap-
peal of Paley’s watch analogy. We conclude that the reason why some
scientists find the design argument compelling and others do not lies
not in any intrinsic differences in assessing design in nature but rather
in the prior probability they place on complexity being produced by
chance events or by a Creator. This difference provides atheists and
theists with a rational basis for disagreement.
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For many scientists and philosophers, David Hume’s critique (1779) and
Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection (1859) have definitely under-
mined the idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts to
design in nature. Yet the argument from design remains one of the most
popular arguments for God’s existence. It enjoys an enduring appeal, go-
ing back to as early as Plato’s Timaeus, Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, and
Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. It garnered particular attention
around the turn of the nineteenth century, with William Paley ([1802]
2006) as the best-known example. More recent formulations can be found
in the work of Richard Swinburne (1968), Alvin Plantinga (1991), and
proponents of intelligent design. Some, for example Jeffrey Wattles (2006),
have argued that the appeal of the design argument can be explained by
Aristotle’s pervasive influence on Western philosophy and theology in his
concept of nature as inherently purposive. Although cultural factors unde-
niably played an important role, we propose that the popularity of the
design argument runs deeper and that its argumentative structure can be
traced to evolved properties of the human mind.
Recent discussions of the design argument in philosophy and theology
(such as Robertson 2007, letter 6) have paid relatively little attention to
the psychological underpinnings that lead to the understanding and ac-
ceptance or rejection of this argument. In this essay we investigate the
cognitive basis of the design argument, drawing on empirical studies from
developmental and experimental psychology. We focus on two aspects: the
tendency of humans to discern teleology in nature, and the way they intu-
itively assess probabilities. A better understanding of these aspects not only
elucidates the lasting popularity of the design argument but also can help
theists and atheists to construct a rational basis for disagreement.
We begin by outlining an analysis of the epistemic properties of the
design argument. Next, we examine the cognitive basis of teleological rea-
soning and the design stance in children and adults. We then discuss the
probabilistic aspects of the design argument. Finally, we explore why the-
ists and atheists disagree on the plausibility of the argument.
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN
The argument for the existence of a divine creator that is based on evi-
dence of design in nature has recently enjoyed a revival in theology and
philosophy. Biologist Richard Dawkins ([1986] 1991, 4–5) praises the ar-
gument for its explanatory coherence and intuitive appeal. Paley’s image of
the watch on the heath was certainly not the earliest formulation of the
design argument, or even of the watch analogy, but its familiarity makes it
a suitable starting point. The argument Paley presented in Natural Theol-
ogy can be summarized as follows: When one encounters a watch, the com-
plexity of this artifact and the interrelations of its parts lead to the inference
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that it is the product of purposive design. From this Paley concluded that
complexity in nature is also the product of a Designer, because proposing
that it could have come about by chance would be absurd (Paley [1802]
2006, 7–15).
This argument has interesting epistemic properties: It is both an anal-
ogy and an inference to the best explanation. Analogies map the structure
of a well-known domain (the source domain) onto a lesser-known prob-
lem (the target domain). In distant analogies the structures of source and
target domains greatly differ in their basic ontological properties. The de-
sign argument is a distant analogy in that it maps the artifactual domain
(source domain) onto the natural world (target domain). Artifacts exhibit
goal-directedness in their design; they are intentionally created by design-
ers who had their function in mind. Because organisms exhibit goal-di-
rectness in their design, they must also be the product of a purposeful
designer. Although this analogical structure has been attacked on the ground
that it is inconclusive (Hume 1779; Frank 2004), distant analogies are well
established in scientific practice as a way to gain insight into new prob-
lems. When the conceptual structure of the target domain is relatively
unknown, as in the case of scientific discovery, scientists often resort to
analogical reasoning of this sort as an epistemic action. Historical examples
include Johannes Kepler’s mapping of the properties of gravity onto the
properties of light—the fact that sunlight dissipates with increasing dis-
tance between the Sun and the planets it is cast upon—to explain why
planets farther from the Sun move more slowly, in this case, caused by a
weakening of the gravitational force with increasing distance from the Sun
(Gentner et al. 1997), and Darwin’s analogy of a hundred thousand wedges
to examine the force of natural selection (Millman and Smith 1997). A
more recent example is the Swiss army knife analogy as a way to conceptu-
alize the evolved structure of the human brain in evolutionary psychology
(Cosmides and Tooby 1995, 88). The analogical structure of the design
argument is thus epistemic; it is used to gain insight into an unfamiliar
domain (God’s creation). In many early versions, the design argument served
a heuristic rather than a strictly argumentative purpose, as in the works of
seventeenth-century natural philosophers such as Bernard Nieuwentijt and
Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, who perceived design as a source of wonder-
ment about nature.
Traditionally, design arguments had an inductive argumentative struc-
ture. They began with the empirical observation that all complex, func-
tional objects of known origin were products of intelligent design. Then
came the inductive step, in which one infers that what is true for some
members of a class is true for all members. Hume (1779, part II, 56–60)
dispensed with this way of reasoning by arguing that artifacts and biologi-
cal organisms are too dissimilar to be classed together. When we see a house,
we can reasonably infer that it has an architect or builder because we know
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from experience that this particular effect flows from that particular cause.
But we have no guarantee that the universe bears such a resemblance to a
house as to invoke a Designer; we do not know how far our analogy is
reliable. Indeed, because an object resembles other objects in that it has
property P does not imply that it also resembles them in other respects. To
suppose that it does is affirming the consequent, which is a logical mistake.
Although Paley did not mention Hume explicitly, the structure of his
watchmaker analogy escaped this criticism by adopting a different strat-
egy. It is an inference to the best explanation (IBE), which has the follow-
ing structure:
IBE  Given evidence E and a pool of plausible, potential explanations H1, . . . ,
Hn of E, if Hi explains E better than any of the other hypotheses, infer that Hi is
closer to the truth than any of these others. (Douven 2002, 359)
IBE enables us to probabilistically infer that a given hypothesis is closer to
the truth than other hypotheses because it explains the available evidence
better than rival explanations. In this probabilistic aspect, the design argu-
ment differs from deductive proofs for the existence of God, such as Anselm’s
ontological proof. IBE escapes Hume’s critique because it does not rely on
induction; it simply argues that there is no better explanation for order
and complexity than design (Gliboff 2000). This fundamental probabilis-
tic aspect of the design argument has received relatively little attention in
the philosophical literature (but see Sober 2002).
Having established apparent design and probabilistic inference as two
key properties of the design argument, we now examine the possible cog-
nitive bases for its rational acceptability.
HOW WE INFER DESIGN
The Design Stance. To Paley, the conclusion that a watch is purpose-
fully designed was self-evident. Our perception of its interrelated parts,
formed and adjusted to each other—the coiled elastic spring, the flexible
chains, the cogwheels—each fashioned out of the material that suits their
intended function best, should lead us to infer that the watch must have
had a maker who formed it for a specific purpose. Yet Paley acknowledged
that such seemingly spontaneous inferences require contextual knowledge
about the artifact under consideration: “it requires indeed an examination
of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to
perceive and understand it” (Paley [1802] 2006, 8). In the case of the
watch, Paley could infer the intent of the designer because he was familiar
with the class of artifacts to which the watch belongs. But what would
happen if he pitched his foot against an unfamiliar object, such as an iPod?
Would he have inferred design as automatically as in the case of the watch?
Its sleek shape, carefully integrated buttons, and intended function would
have presented a puzzle to him. Unfamiliar artifacts can be so outlandish
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that people can be led to believe that they are not the work of human
designers. During World War II, when the indigenous inhabitants of Papua
New Guinea were first confronted with Western goods from the American
army, they believed that these were gifts of the ancestors. This led to the
emergence of cargo cults, whose adherents are still trying to ritually lure
airplanes into dropping more cargo, more Western goods (Frank 2004).
And what to think of people who observe UFOs? Often these alleged space-
ships are no more than military reconnaissance airplanes, crashing weather
balloons, or bright planets. Nevertheless, people infer that the objects are
intentionally designed by supernatural agents and by extraterrestrials re-
spectively. To gain a better understanding of the design argument, it is
therefore useful to examine how humans infer design, what constitutes
necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a product of de-
sign, and how creator and artifact are causally linked.
Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that design is not a
feature we can objectively infer. Remarkably, neither complexity nor order
is a necessary and sufficient condition to decide whether an object is pur-
posefully created. For example, Susan Gelman and Karen Ebeling (1998)
showed two-year-olds a stain vaguely resembling a bear. They told some
subjects that the spot was created accidentally, by kicking over a bottle of
paint, whereas another group learned that the shape was painted inten-
tionally. Only the children in the latter group called it “a bear.” Thus the
perception of the stain as representational or accidental depends critically
on the prior information the children received on how it was brought about.
In a similar experiment (Gelman and Bloom 2000), adults saw a variety of
artifacts but were given two different accounts of how the objects came
into being. In the unintentional version a piece of cloth was accidentally
caught in a machine, resulting in holes being punched at regular intervals.
In the intentional version, a person took scissors and carefully cut holes at
regular intervals. Subjects were more prone to call the object “a belt” if
they believed it was intentionally created. Apparently, design is in the eye
of the beholder; our judgment that something is an artifact depends on
our foreknowledge that the artifact was intentionally created. Once we are
familiar with specific classes of artifacts, we can reasonably infer that a
particular member of a class was created with the intention of belonging to
this class. When we see a chair in a pile of rubbish, we conclude that the
object was created to fulfill a specific function (to sit on) and to be of a
specific class (chairs). This stance also provides useful inferences when we
have to identify classes of nonutilitarian objects, such as ships in bottles.
Although they will never sail, we still call them ships because the designer
intended them to belong to this class of objects. The intimate relationship
between design and intention was noted by Daniel Dennett (1987, 16–
17) and Paul Bloom (1996) who argue that humans take an intuitive de-
sign stance: We use the designer’s intention to infer the class the object
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belongs to. Paley relied on this inference in his assertion that the watch was
a product of intentional design.
Conversely, knowledge of the designer’s intention can help us to infer
an object’s intended function or identity. Bloom and Lori Markson (1998)
conducted experiments in which three- and four-year-olds were shown
featureless ovals that were purportedly drawn by a child with a broken arm
who because of this could not draw well. The young subjects were told
that these were drawings of chickens (three vertical ovals) and a pig (one
horizontal oval). When prompted, the preschoolers effortlessly identified
the pig, because they reasonably inferred that the artist would draw objects
from the same category in the same way. Young children intuitively regard
the creator of an artifact as having privileged knowledge about both its
name and its intended function. This was illustrated by an experiment
(Jaswal 2006) in which preschoolers saw objects that were given an anoma-
lous label. The experimenter showed the children a key-shaped object and
said “You are not going to believe this, but this is actually a spoon.” They
were willing to adopt the anomalous name only if the experimenter re-
ferred to the object as something he created, not as something he merely
found. Recognizing that the creator of an artifact has the prerogative to
name it marks an important step in the development of the design stance.
The intended function and identity of an object thus inextricably link
the creator with the created object. This aspect of the design stance is par-
ticularly interesting in the case of broken objects. Although broken watches
and fragile chairs cannot perform their intended function, we still name
these objects watches and chairs because they were originally created to
fulfill the intended function of their artifact class. When nine-year-olds
and adults are presented with broken artifacts, they still label them accord-
ing to their intended function, except if the transformation has changed
the object beyond recognition (Gutheil et al. 2004). Paley voiced this intu-
ition aptly when he stated,
neither . . . would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went
wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the
design, and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be
evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or
whether we could account for it or not. . . . If by the loss, or disorder, or decay of
the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped,
or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or
intention of these parts. (Paley [1802] 2006, 8–9)
The human propensity of inferring design may be due to the distinct
evolutionary history of our species. Humans rely to a unique extent on
tools for their survival. Whereas other primates use mostly unmodified
objects as tools, archaeological evidence for stone-knapping in hominids
goes back as far as 2.6 million years (Semaw 2000). By adopting the design
stance hominid children may have learned to use and fashion tools more
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efficiently. Indeed, comparative studies of social learning in children and
chimpanzees reveal stark contrasts in the way new tools are used. Whereas
children take the intention of the person who demonstrates these tools as
guidance, chimpanzees rely more extensively on the physical properties of
the tools to figure out how they work (Horner and Whiten 2005). The
design stance provides children with a useful heuristic to learn about their
environment. It allows them to “ignore the actual (possibly messy) details
of the physical constitution of an object, and [relying on] the assumption
that it has a certain design, predict that it will behave as it is designed to
behave under various circumstances” (Dennett 1987, 16–17). Without
the design stance, we would not possibly learn to use and name hundreds
of tools and other artifacts but would perhaps be limited to the less than
ten tool types a typical community of wild chimpanzees entertains (Whiten
et al. 1999). The hypothesis that the design stance is a product of natural
selection, rather than the cultural product of Aristotelian teleology, finds
support in the fact that it also occurs in non-Western cultures, even those
where material culture is relatively sparse, like the Shuar, an Andean Na-
tive American culture (German and Barrett 2005), and that infants and
young toddlers rely on it to learn the names of novel objects and how to
use them (Casler and Kelemen 2007).
Intuitive Teleology. Whereas the design stance may have evolved for
the purpose of rapidly categorizing and using artifacts, humans also pos-
sess a natural propensity for teleological reasoning. This propensity is most
marked for biological entities, but it can apply to almost all categories of
objects. Across cultures (see Barrett 2004), humans have the intuition that
animals and plants possess adaptations that are self-beneficial, such as claws
for defense or thorns for protection against being eaten. Young children,
however, attribute purpose not only to artifacts and biological adaptations
but also to entire organisms (What are lions for? “to go in the zoo”) and
nonliving natural kinds like clouds (“for raining”)—a tendency termed
“promiscuous teleology” (Kelemen 2004). Moreover, when given a choice
between teleological and nonteleological explanations, preschoolers and
elementary school children prefer teleological accounts. When asked
whether rocks are pointy because of natural processes (“bits of stuff piled
up for a long period of time”) or because of teleological functions (“so that
animals could scratch on them when they got itchy”), children typically
endorse the latter (Kelemen 2003). At ten to twelve years of age, the pref-
erence for teleological explanations lessens, probably because adolescents
acquire elaborate coherent mechanistic explanations through schooling.
Although mountains can be climbed, few adults would claim that moun-
tains are there to climb on. This is because our learned knowledge that
mountains are formed by tectonic activity or volcanism is incompatible
with teleological explanations, where the function provides a sufficient rea-
son for why the structure exists.
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Remarkably, patients with Alzheimer’s disease show a reemerging pref-
erence for teleological explanations. They think that rain is there so that
plants and animals can have water to drink and grow, rather than the ac-
quired explanation that rain occurs by water condensing into clouds and
forming droplets (Lombrozo, Kelemen, and Zaitchik 2007). An increased
tendency to teleology is also observed in people with little schooling such
as Roma adults (Gypsies of central European descent). Formal education
seems to reduce a preference for teleological explanations, but it cannot
eradicate them. Indeed, when educated adults are forced to make speedy
judgments, they too show a heightened acceptance of teleological explana-
tions. When judging at a glance whether or not a statement is correct, they
tend to endorse teleological, incorrect explanations, such as “The Sun ra-
diates heat because warmth nurtures life” (Kelemen and Rosset 2009). Rea-
soning strategies observed in children persist into adulthood but may be
masked by secondary explanatory strategies. Once these become impaired
(in the case of Alzheimer’s patients) or are unavailable (in the case of speedy
judgments or lack of education), the intuitive, evolved strategies of child-
hood reemerge.
Although scientific education tends to lessen teleological reasoning, the
tendency to apply teleology is not absent even among trained scientists.
An analysis of the paleoanthropological literature (the study of human evo-
lution) reveals that early theorists relied on extrascientific intuitive explana-
tory strategies. Until the late 1970s many paleoanthropologists thought
that separate lineages of human races evolved toward an idealized end-
point, modern humans—a process denoted as orthogenesis, which is now
uniformly rejected (De Cruz and De Smedt 2007).
Teleology is no longer considered a valid scientific principle in biology.
It is hard to refrain from thinking that the eye’s function is “for seeing,”
whereas it is more in tune with evolutionary theory to say that the eye’s
function can be described in terms of the effects it had for reproduction
and survival in past organisms in which this structure evolved. Neverthe-
less, teleology is a useful heuristic to make sense of our everyday artifactual
and biological environment. It enables us at a glance to see what a tool is
for (a sharp edge for cutting, for example) or to categorize animals as dan-
gerous or not (the presence of claws or fangs). As Immanuel Kant had
already argued in his Critique of Judgment ([1790] 1987, part II, §66), we
use teleological explanations because the concept of purpose makes living
things and artifacts more intelligible to us. The central place of teleology
in human cognition can perhaps explain why it remains an important philo-
sophical and theological principle despite its lack of scientific plausibility.
The fact that our psychological propensities are sometimes at odds with
scientific knowledge does not necessarily affect the rationality of our judg-
ments. Not only are they often indispensable in everyday reasoning (our
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understanding of artifacts would be seriously compromised without the
design stance), but concepts such as design or purpose would be meaning-
less without them. Whether or not such concepts are also scientifically mean-
ingful is to be empirically discovered.
Are Humans Intuitive Theists? Does the tendency to infer design
also entail an inference to a Designer, as Paley and others have suggested?
At this point, developmental and experimental psychological data do not
present a unified picture. Tania Lombrozo and colleagues (2007) found
that although Alzheimer patients reasoned more teleologically, they were
not more likely than healthy control subjects to invoke God as an explana-
tion. In a study that probed Dutch primary school children’s intuitive theo-
ries on the origin of species (Samarapungavan and Wiers 1997), the answers
clustered together in different categories, including spontaneous genera-
tion, Lamarckism, and pure essentialism (that is, animals and plants have
always existed). Although many children made teleological inferences, only
about ten percent made explicit reference to God or intelligent design.
However, a comparable experiment in the United States by E. Margaret
Evans (2001) found that the majority of ten-year-olds endorsed creationist
accounts of the origin of species regardless of their religious background.
Deborah Kelemen and Cara DiYanni (2005) obtained comparable results
with British elementary school children, although the percentage of cre-
ationist accounts was significantly lower than with American subjects.
Several possible explanations may account for these findings. A strong
position holds that humans are intuitive theists. In this view, creationism
is a natural mode of reasoning that is altered only when children acquire
explicitly nonreligious beliefs from their cultural environment. Jesse Bering
(2006) defends this position, arguing that religious beliefs are biological
adaptations that were directly selected to enhance cooperation, altruism,
and group cohesion. A weaker position (Bloom 2007, for example) holds
that religious belief itself is not innate but a byproduct of other cognitive
adaptations such as agency detection and theory of mind. In this view,
children acquire culturally transmitted religious beliefs easily because these
key in on evolved propensities of the human mind. Here the step from
design to Designer is not automatically made but needs to be made ex-
plicit, as Paley and others did. Support for this latter view comes from
experiments in which Hindu (Barrett 1998) and Christian (Barrett and
Keil 1996) college students had to recall stories about God. In doing so,
they unconsciously distorted the stories to fit God into intuitive expecta-
tions they had about normal people, such as attending to only one person
or one event at the same time. This indicates that representing an omni-
scient, omnipresent being is cognitively demanding and that expectations
about human agents structure reasoning about divine agents. Another view,
suggested by Taede Smedes as he read this essay, holds that intuitive theism
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may be an evolved module, but it depends on external cultural circum-
stances for its development in the same way as the language faculty re-
quires appropriate linguistic input to develop properly.
It is our belief that the experimental evidence does not support the view
that there is an intuitive theism. Still required is an assignment of a prob-
ability to the existence of a Designer. In the next section, we look in more
detail at the probabilistic aspects of the design argument.
INTUITIVE PROBABILITY: CAN CHANCE EVENTS PRODUCE
ORDER AND COMPLEXITY?
The Annales and the Boeing. Joseph Butler (1736) already observed
that all human reasoning is probabilistic: Because we are finite beings with
knowledge that is restricted in time and space, we cannot claim absolute
knowledge. From imperfect observations we regularly draw far-reaching
conclusions. Humans are naturally endowed with the ability to detect sta-
tistical frequencies in their environment. (For a comprehensive overview,
see De Cruz 2009.) This ability is not restricted to humans; it occurs in a
wide variety of animal species, including those with relatively simple ner-
vous systems such as bumblebees (Real 1991). Human infants use prob-
ability inference to learn about their environment, such as the statistical
detection of recurring sound patterns to chunk streams of continuous speech
into words, which is crucial for word learning (Aslin, Saffran, and New-
port 1998). The design argument draws on our evolved ability to assess
posterior probability, the probability that is assigned after the relevant evi-
dence is taken into account. From the age of five onward, humans are
fairly accurate in making such assessments (Girotto and Gonzales 2008).
For example, if preschoolers are shown that more red than green chips are
placed in a bag, they will correctly state that there is a higher chance that
the experimenter will draw a red chip. However, if the experimenter says “I
can feel that the chip in my hand is round” and proportionally more round
chips are green, children will update their probabilistic judgments in favor
of green.
How likely is it that the apparent design in nature was intentionally
created or, alternatively, that it happened by chance? Early proponents of
the design argument have taken their intuition that chance does not pro-
duce order as a starting point:
He who believes this may as well believe that if a great quantity of the one-and-
twenty letters . . . were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order
as to legibly form the Annales of Ennius. I doubt whether fortune could make a
single verse of them. How, therefore, can these people assert that the world was
made by the fortuitous concourse of atoms? (Cicero 45 B.C., book 2, § XXXVII)
Cicero discarded the atomists’ idea that chance collisions of elementary
building blocks (atoms) formed the material world on the basis that chance
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has a low probability of producing order. Assuming that the 21 letters of
the Roman alphabet are equally distributed into his “great quantity,” the
chance of the first letter’s falling in the correct place is 1/21, the chance
that the first two letters are correct is thus 1/21 x 1/21 = 1/441 (if the space
is also treated as a letter, it would be 1/22 x 1/22 = 1/484). The chance that
the letters would produce the approximately 7,000 characters of the 600
lines that survive of Ennius’ Annales (a now fragmentary epic poem on the
history of Rome) is vanishingly small, being 1/217000. Cicero’s intuition
has been reiterated many times, including astronomer Fred Hoyle’s image
of hurling around scrap metal at random and happening to assemble a
Boeing 747. Although all arrangements of the scrap metal are, with hind-
sight, equally improbable, very few of them will fly; similarly, although all
combinations of 21 letters are equally unique, very few of them will pro-
duce a legible text, let alone the Annales.
William Dembski (1998) has developed this inference as the basis for
his defense of intelligent design. Although it is intuitively compelling, re-
jecting chance as an explanation for complexity and design is problematic
because, as Elliott Sober (2002) notes, there is no probabilistic equivalent
of modus tollens. In other words, we cannot state that
If hypothesis H were true, observation O would be highly improbable.
But O.
Therefore, H is not true.
The lottery paradox aptly illustrates this. Assume a fair lottery in which
only 1 of 1,000 tickets is the winner. The probability of winning this lot-
tery is very low. Yet winning the lottery does not cast doubt on its fairness.
The law of likelihood in statistics stipulates that it is not the absolute value
of the probability of data under a single hypothesis that is to be considered
but rather how the probability values compare under different hypotheses.
The intuitive idea that improbability strengthens the existence of God
is problematic in that it tacitly relies on an analogy between human and
divine agency. When deciding whether human design or chance is respon-
sible, we rely on empirical knowledge of what human agents in fact do. In
an example from Kenneth Himma (2005), adapted from Dembski (1998),
suppose a political candidate’s name appears first on the lists of voting
ballots 40 out of 41 times. The probability of such an event’s occurring by
chance is very small. But when we suspect that a county clerk rigged the
list, we rely on two pieces of tacit knowledge: that undecided voters are
more likely to choose the first on the list, and that the county clerk wants
a particular candidate to win. Being an intelligent agent, it is not unlikely
that he rigged the list. We also know of cases in which ballots were tam-
pered with to win an election. Hence the hypothesis that the name was
placed first 40 out of 41 times by design rather than mere chance becomes
very plausible indeed.
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In the case of divine action, however, we do not have empirical knowl-
edge to draw upon, and thus no assumptions can be made about what
God would or would not do. It is not possible to accord prior probabilities
to the existence of God on the basis of empirical evidence. Without the
necessary background data to make the design argument an IBE, this ar-
gument relies on an analogy between human and divine agency. Again,
this version of the design argument becomes an argument from analogy.
As we have seen, this was successfully attacked by Hume, and it was pre-
cisely for this reason that Paley recast the argument from design into an
IBE.
Probability and Inference to the Best Explanation. The reliability of
IBE as an abductive strategy depends on the amount and quality of the
data and the relevance of the data to the conclusion. If insufficient evi-
dence is available, IBE may well lead us to choose “the best of a bad lot”
(van Fraassen 1989, 143). In fact, the bad-lot argument even applies if one
has all the possible evidence, because one may simply have failed to con-
ceive of the true theory with this evidence in hand. If each letter that falls
correctly is selectively retained, we need at most 21 x 7,000 trials to com-
plete what is now left of the Annales. Cicero, being unacquainted with the
principle of cumulative selective retention, did not envision this possibil-
ity. Dawkins ([1986] 1991, 46–48) uses a similar analogy to illustrate this
point: Whereas one monkey could not possibly type a sentence from Ham-
let, selective retention of keystrokes by many typing monkeys would solve
the problem.
When using an IBE strategy, however, most modern versions of the
design argument do not take natural selection and its principle of cumula-
tive selective retention into account as a viable explanation. Dembski (1998),
for example, holds that regularity, chance, and design exhaust the possi-
bilities, thereby sidestepping the combination of chance and regularity that
is natural selection. To be sure, in 1802 natural selection was not in the
pool of possible explanations. However, as Sander Gliboff (2000) demon-
strates, Paley did have a range of alternative materialist explanations, of
which we mention three. First, necessity: Because everything has to have
some form, it may as well be the present form; for example, the eye is the
actual realization of the possible ways to fill an eye socket. Second, he
considered infinite trial and error: Given an infinite time and universe,
every possible configuration of matter could be produced, some of which
turned out to be viable life-forms that persisted and reproduced—an in-
teresting precursor to the concept of natural selection. Third, he discussed
the claim that parts of organisms could arise before their function was
determined, a forerunner of exaptation theory (Paley [1802] 2006, 38–41).
These alternatives were being explored and hotly debated in Paley’s time
by early evolutionists such as Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon,
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Denis Diderot, and Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach. Paley seems fa-
miliar with these authors, as he mentioned Buffon explicitly and others
implicitly. Next to these, he briefly discussed the special biological forces
or organizing principles proposed by the Göttingen school of German bi-
ologists, such as Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer,
and Johann Christian Reil (Paley [1802] 2006, 218–25). Although re-
jected now, their Newtonian approach to biology in which they stipulated
forces acting on biological entities (analogous to physical forces acting on
physical entities) was conceivable and widely accepted at the time. The
idea proposed by atomists such as Democritos and Lucretius that very im-
probable things may happen in an infinite universe has its modern statisti-
cal formulation in Persi Diaconis and Frederick Mosteller, who write that
“with a large enough sample, any outrageous thing is likely to happen”
(1989, 859).
What led Paley to reject these alternatives? His answer was that the pur-
ported natural propensities required intelligent design: “I am unwilling to
give to it the name of an atheistic scheme . . . because, so far as I am able to
understand it, the original propensities and the numberless varieties of
them . . . are, in the plan itself, attributed to the ordination and appoint-
ment of an intelligent and designing Creator” ([1802] 2006, 224–25).
One could dismiss this as a circular argument in that he rejected naturalis-
tic explanations because they point to a Designer, the proposition that had
to be proven. We want to argue that it can likewise be seen as arising out of
the high probability Paley accorded to the existence of God. As we argue in
the next section, the likelihood of data can be meaningfully assessed only
in relationship with hypotheses, which are accorded a prior probability.
A RATIONAL BASIS FOR DISAGREEMENT
If humans are prone to discern design and teleology in nature, why do
some find the design argument more compelling than others? This may be
due not to intrinsic differences in the way design and teleology are dis-
cerned but to differences in the prior probability people place on the exist-
ence of a Designer.
An interesting way to approach this problem is through an examination
of how humans regard coincidences. For Thomas Griffiths and Joshua
Tenenbaum (2007), an event is a coincidence if it is judged to have a lower
probability of occurring under our current theory of how the world works
than under an alternative hypothesis. Coincidence plays an important epi-
stemic role in scientific discovery: The meteorologist Alfred Wegener noted
that the coastlines of West Africa and South America fit into each other
like puzzle pieces, that their geological strata matched, and that the distri-
bution of species on both sides of the Atlantic was highly correlated. He
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thought that this pattern was not a mere coincidence but that these conti-
nents were once joined and had drifted apart. In the nineteenth century,
physician John Snow noted that cholera outbreaks in London tended to
cluster at public water pumps and inferred that this was not a coincidence
but provided evidence for his theory that cholera was transmitted through
polluted water (rather than bad air, the then favored theory).
These examples suggest an intimate connection between coincidence
and evidence. A coincidence occurs when the likelihood ratio in favor of an
alternative theory is insufficient to overwhelm the prior odds against it. A
coincidence becomes evidence when the likelihood ratio in favor of an
alternative theory overcomes the prior odds against it and leads us to ac-
cept that alternative theory. Because people differ in the prior probabilities
they assign to alternative hypotheses, what is a coincidence to one person
can be considered compelling evidence by another.
In the case of the design argument, the competing hypotheses are Hmat
(purposive and complex structures arose strictly through natural, material
causes) and Hdeo (design as the result of a Designer). In the framework of
Hmat, the occurrence of ordered complexity and apparent design presents a
coincidence. Given that chance events tend to produce disorder, the prob-
ability of this occurrence is extremely low. Darwin’s theory of natural selec-
tion has successfully solved this dilemma, because it relies on a combination
of chance and lawlike processes. Indeed, no other naturalistic theory can
explain why living things are improbably complex, why the interrelation-
ships between their parts are highly functional, and why they exhibit fea-
tures that enhance their probability of surviving and reproducing in their
environment. Proponents of Hmat can find epistemic justification in Darwin’s
explanation of design. To justify why they favor their view rather than
Hdeo, they can cite examples of maladaptedness and appeal to ontological
parsimony because their explanation is restricted to observable, causal physi-
cal processes. In Hdeo the occurrence of design is not improbable, because
this theory explicitly proposes a Designer who made the universe orderly
and purposeful. Under these epistemic circumstances, but not under Hmat,
design in nature becomes corroborative evidence for the existence of a Cre-
ator. Next to this, natural theologians can also appeal to ontological parsi-
mony, because it reduces many kinds of explanation to one under Hdeo
(Swinburne 1968).
This model of prior probabilities explains three puzzling facts. First, it
explains why evolutionary thinkers writing before 1859 did not accept
natural theology’s design argument. Even in Paley’s time, not everyone was
led to accept Hdeo, although the arguments in favor of natural theology
were widespread. Early evolutionists, including Erasmus Darwin and bi-
ologists of the Göttingen school, sought to describe biological forces that
could assemble complexity in the same way as Isaac Newton had done for
mechanics. These authors had a strong commitment to a physicalist world-
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view leading them to adopt the view that Hdeo was unlikely, even though
they did not have a compelling causal explanation for the apparent design.
Second, it explains why the design argument, despite its intuitive appeal,
fails to convince nonbelievers. As long as plausible naturalistic explana-
tions for design in nature are available, the design argument will fail to
overturn their prior beliefs. Third, it may elucidate why well-established
scientific data do not persuade believers of design of the opposite. This is
shown paradigmatically in the United States, where everyone has access to
scientific education, yet creationism and intelligent design are widespread,
and many express severe distrust of evolutionary theory (see Miller, Scott,
and Okamoto 2006). The epistemic force of the prior probabilities we
accord to competing hypotheses is an important element in scientific and
other formalized ways of reasoning. It can explain why scientists are un-
willing to let go of a cherished theory even in spite of overwhelming evi-
dence against it, as already described by Thomas Kuhn (1962). For theists,
design in nature provides compelling circumstantial evidence for the exist-
ence of a Creator. Take as an illustration the Thomistic tradition, which
emphasizes the role of understanding and knowledge (scientia) in belief. In
this view, a successful natural theology would start out from self-evident
premises, proceed by valid arguments, and reach the conclusion that there
is a person such as God (Plantinga 1991). As we have seen, humans are
prone to discern design and teleology in nature. Within the epistemic con-
text of Hdeo, the perceived design in nature that is a universal feature of
human cognition can be taken as a self-evident premise from which the
existence of a Creator can be argued. It is not a stand-alone argument that
can convince those who do not believe in God (see also Himma 2005),
especially since plausible naturalistic explanations have become available.
IS THERE STILL A PLACE FOR THE DESIGN ARGUMENT?
Undeniably, the power of the design argument as an inference to the best
explanation has been seriously weakened since Darwin and Alfred Wallace
independently came up with natural selection as a naturalistic explanation
for design. Given that the combination of random events and selective
retention can explain most of the apparent design around us, can theolo-
gians still reasonably invoke design? Misrepresenting or altogether neglect-
ing natural selection is the strategy most commonly adopted by intelligent-
design proponents. Intelligent design is not a very desirable position for
theologians to take, however, because it makes scientific claims that need
to be evaluated by scientific standards. As a scientific research program, it
fails because its hypothesis of a Designer is too vague and too general to
count as a scientific hypothesis; it cannot be used as a basis for empirical
testing. Even concepts such as irreducible complexity are too broad and
too vacuous to be investigated by biologists; to date, there are no satisfying
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models of complexity that allow for investigation by empirical, quantita-
tive methods. Moreover, using scientific standards to argue for divine ac-
tion is a category mistake, because God is not an immanent cause like
other natural causes (Smedes 2008).
The most productive way for theologians and scientists to look at the
argument from design is to treat it as a metaphysical rather than a scientific
principle. Within this perspective, we think there are at least two cases in
which a design position is still defensible. A first case is presented by a
position that endorses evolutionary biology but argues that God inter-
venes occasionally to fashion structures that could not have arisen through
natural selection. In this position, one endorses intelligent design as a philo-
sophical position but not as a scientific research program that conceptual-
izes evolution and design as competing scientific explanations. Theologically,
it follows a distinction that is commonly made between God’s general ac-
tions (which pertain to the universe as a whole and can be seen in the laws
that govern physical, chemical, and biological processes) and special ac-
tions (which lie beyond normal physical processes). Whereas natural selec-
tion and other evolutionary processes belong to the former category,
occasional design or intervention in these belongs to the latter.
Jeffery Johnson and Joyclynn Potter (2005) propose that human natural
language may be the product of purposive creation. They base their argu-
ment on the fact that adaptationist explanations require a plausible reason
for why the adaptation evolved. Adaptations evolve in response to specific
selective pressures and enhance the survival and reproduction of their bear-
ers. For language, there are as yet no persuasive adaptationist explanations.
We do not know what language is an adaptation for or how and when it
evolved. Despite the proliferation of adaptationist stories on the origin of
language, such as social grooming, technological intelligence, cooperative
hunting, and sexual selection, none of these hypotheses has been able to
substantiate itself into a theory. This leads Johnson and Potter to infer to
the best explanation that purposive design brought language into being.
Their position is distinct from intelligent design in that they explicitly
endorse evolutionary theory as the best explanation for complexity in the
living world.
A second, perhaps stronger, case (because it does not rely on a God of
the gaps) is found in scientists and theologians who regard design and
evolution as complementary rather than mutually exclusive explanatory
frameworks. Watchmakers do not build watches from scratch but rather
rely on the gradually accumulated innovations in timekeeping technology,
which we can trace back to sundials and waterclocks, to the introduction
of the spring, to the modern digital watch. Upon close scrutiny, very few
inventions appear de novo; most are the result of a gradual and cumulative
retention of favorable variations (Basalla 1988). The streamlined design of
Polynesian canoes, which is close to optimum, can be traced through ar-
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chaeological and historical data as the gradual and unconscious retention
of favorable variations, with the perilous ocean as the selecting agent (Rogers
and Ehrlich 2008).
These insights on the origin of artifacts can be extended to divine de-
sign. Nineteenth-century botanist Asa Gray defended the view that natu-
ral selection is an “a-fortiori extension to the supposed case of a watch
which sometimes produces better watches, and contrivances adapted to
successive conditions, and so at length turns out a chronometer, a town
clock, or a series of organisms of the same type” (Gray 1888, 57). Cell
biologist Kenneth Miller argues that God has initiated natural selection
and other natural evolutionary processes as an indirect way to create com-
plexity and design. For him, the undetermined nature of evolution through
natural selection and other natural processes enabled the evolution of truly
free, truly independent beings (Miller [1999] 2007, 213, 238, 253). Theo-
dosius Dobzhansky, one of the founding fathers of the modern synthesis,
wrote, “The organic diversity becomes . . . reasonable and understandable
if the Creator has created the living world not by caprice but by evolution
propelled by natural selection. . . . Evolution is God’s, or Nature’s, method
of Creation” (Dobzhansky 1973, 127). This position is stronger than in-
telligent design, because proponents of the latter—who see natural and
supernatural causes as competing explanations for complexity in the living
world—in many cases need to acknowledge that natural selection is the
better explanation. This problem is avoided when one allows for the possi-
bility that evolution and design are not mutually exclusive.
On the basis of modern evolutionary theory it is not possible to reject
either Hmat or Hdeo. Both positions depend on prior probabilities that are
assigned on the basis not of scientific evidence but of metaphysical prin-
ciples. It is interesting that both positions, physicalism and naturalistic
theism, already existed in the earliest stages of evolutionary theory. Whereas
Darwin and Thomas Huxley did not provide room for God in their ex-
planatory frameworks, Wallace and Gray were theists who treated divine
action as complementary with a scientific worldview, not as a competitor.
Wallace, while continuing to endorse natural selection as the chief prin-
ciple guiding the evolution of plants and animals, invoked intelligent de-
sign for the human mind: “The brain of pre-historic and of savage man
seems to me to prove the existence of some power, distinct from that which
has guided the development of the lower animals through their ever-vary-
ing forms of being” (1871, 343). Martin Fichman (2001) aptly argues that
Wallace’s theism, rather than an about-face, was an integral part of his
evolutionary thinking. Today, both schools of thought continue to exist
side by side, with Dawkins and Dennett as examples of strict materialists
and Miller and Simon Conway Morris as proponents of theistic evolution.
To summarize, the argumentative structure of the design argument can
be traced back to evolved biases of the human brain. It relies on the design
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stance, which leads us to treat complex and purposive structures as the
product of design, and on intuitive teleology, the propensity of humans to
discern purpose in nature. These cognitive biases are universal, although
they can be masked by formal education or strengthened by religious up-
bringing. The step from design to Designer is perhaps more explicit, and
relies on an inference to the best explanation. The plausibility of this infer-
ence relies on the prior probability one places on the existence of God. By
making these differences in prior probability more explicit, theists (natural
theologians, biologists, and philosophers) and physicalist scientists and phi-
losophers have a rational basis for disagreement.
NOTE
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